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operator. This is why the increase of autonomy of weapons 
systems is on the agenda of all technologically advanced 
countries and has triggered a global debate. As the auto­
nomy of weapons systems increases, particularly one central 
question becomes virulent: Would it be ethically justifiable, 
politically responsible and legally allowed in compliance 
with (international) law to delegate the decision on the life 
and death of human beings to machines?
State of development and trends
Autonomous weapons systems capable of targeted action 
in combat operations in a complex dynamic environment 
without any human control do not yet exist. However, over 
the last ten years, the number of state and non­state actors 
who have unmanned weapons systems (UWS) available in 
their arsenals and who partly have already deployed this 
kind of weapons in combat operations has increased signifi­
cantly. This development is almost exclusively attributed to 
remote­controlled aerial combat drones. Advanced combat 
drones can have various autonomous functions, i. a. for flight 
control as well as navigation and reconnaissance tasks. How­
ever, these weapons are usually deployed using remote con­
trol and therefore ultimately still subject to human control. 
Modern guided weapons also have extensive autonomous 
functions. Once started, they can basically search for and en­
gage targets completely independently based on stored sig­
natures. Moreover, some models are said to have the ability 
to independently coordinate the attack strategy with other 
missiles in a salvo or swarm.
Aerial systems are the most advanced in development and 
predominant with regard to the proliferation of UWS. This 
is largely due to the fact that navigation, orientation and 
radio communication are much easier in the air than on 
Summary
 › Robotic weapons systems that can select and engage 
targets without any human intervention are standing 
on the edge of being tangibly implemented.
 › Proponents of this development expect decisive mili­
tary and possibly even humanitarian benefits from such 
autonomous weapons systems.
 › Critics, however, raise concerns over whether it would 
be ethically justifiable, politically responsible and le­
gally allowed in compliance with (international) law 
to delegate the decision on the life and death of human 
beings to machines.
 › Moreover, the development and possible use of AWS 
might entail some risks with regard to security policy.
What is involved
Enormous technological progress in the field of artificial 
intelligence (AI) is enabling a plethora of new applications 
that are about to penetrate and fundamentally transform all 
areas of the economy and life. This development does not 
stop at the military sector either. Intensive research and de­
velopment projects worldwide aim at increasing the degree 
of autonomy of military systems as well as the military use 
of AI. Today, unmanned weapons systems with highly auto­
mated or autonomous functions, e. g. for navigation, target 
recognition or precise guidance (homing), are already in use. 
So far, however, the selection of the target, the decision to 
attack and finally the release of the trigger are the responsi­
bility of a human commander or operator.
An autonomous weapons system (AWS) would be capable 
of carrying out all these steps on its own and without any 
(or with only minimal) human intervention. From a mili­
tary point of view, this is attractive for two main reasons: 
On the one hand, an autonomous system does not require a 
communication link to a base station. On the other hand, it 
allows a faster response in combat situations, since there are 
no delays caused by the runtime of data transmission and by 
the decision­making process or response time of a human 
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AWS would always run the risk of retaliatory measures or 
even escalation with an uncertain outcome. Particularly for 
the nuclear weapons states among themselves, this risk of 
escalation would seriously argue against a deployment of 
AWS that is intended as locally limited.
The availability of AWS might affect both stability in regional 
contexts and the strategic balance of nuclear powers. On 
the one hand, AWS might increase stability by using them 
(e. g. through reconnaissance missions) to obtain and an­
alyse more information. This would provide a better basis 
and more time for human decision­makers to take into con­
sideration all possible consequences of escalation and make 
a well­considered decision. On the other hand, AWS could 
help to speed up operations and decision­making processes 
to such an extent that people involved reach the limits of 
land, on water or underwater. Although the significance of 
unmanned ground and maritime vehicles is also increas­
ing, their operational capabilities are currently still largely 
limited to unarmed purposes (reconnaissance, surveillance, 
logistics, etc.). In addition to aerial systems, there is a strong 
motive particularly for unmanned underwater vehicles to 
implement largely autonomous operation for technical, op­
erational and military strategic reasons. But armed ground 
vehicles equipped with more complex autonomous capabil­
ities are also being worked on intensively. Inherently, there 
are numerous common aspects with civil research on au­
tonomous driving. One focus of current research and de­
velopment projects are unmanned systems that are able to 
communicate and cooperate in swarms.
Implications with regard to security policy
Whether the availability of AWS will lead to an earlier re­
course to military force in the event of conflict or whether 
military conflicts will be conducted more violently is currently 
a controversial question.
In the event that the deployment of AWS significantly re­
duces the risk to the own soldiers, i. a. because AWS take on 
tasks that are dangerous for humans, the inhibition thresh­
old regarding the use of violence might be lowered. Even 
below the threshold of full­scale wars, military operations 
to achieve political goals might become more attractive and 
increasingly the rule.
This argument loses much of its force, however, if not con­
sidering an asymmetric scenario – as it is currently the case 
with drone strikes in Afghanistan, Somalia and elsewhere – 
but one with opponents on an equal footing. In this case, the 
Autonomous, semi-autonomous or 
(highly) automated?
»Autonomous weapons systems should be banned« or »Au­
tonomous weapons systems protect human lives«: The mean­
ing of statements like these usually remains unclear, as it is not 
explained how the term »autonomous« is to be understood. 
It can mean the capacity for moral judgement, which only 
rational, free beings are capable of (in the sense of Imma­
nuel Kant’s philosophy). Autonomous weapons in this sense 
would thus have to show a general human­like intelligence 
including consciousness (strong AI) and not only simulate 
partial aspects of intelligent behaviour (weak AI). It is highly 
speculative whether such intelligent AWS will ever exist.
In contrast, autonomy can also be understood in purely 
operational terms. An AWS in this sense would be able to 




and therefore independently of humans. With this under­
standing of autonomy, however, a mine that explodes as 
soon as a certain weight is placed on it could also be called 
an autonomous weapons system – although its operating 
principle is based on a simple automatism.
Basically, the terms »automatic«, »automated« and »auto­
nomous« – in this order – form a continuum of increasing 
complexity. However, a clear distinction between these 
terms is hardly possible. In particular, the red line from 
which a weapon system must no longer be referred to as 
semi­autonomous but fully autonomous is highly contro­
versial. This is closely linked to the questions of whether 
humans still have sufficient control over the weapons sys­
tem and who bears responsibility for its actions.




this will fuel arms races. Today already, an incipient arms 
race can be observed with increasingly automated UWS (un­
manned weapons systems).
International humanitarian law and ethical 
considerations
International humanitarian law (IHL) is designed to ensure 
the maximum protection of civilians, non­military buildings 
and infrastructures as well as the natural environment in the 
event of international armed conflicts. According to IHL, the 
use of weapons can only be permissible if, firstly, it is direct­
ed only against military targets (principle of distinction). 
Secondly, collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects 
must not be excessive in relation to the direct military utility 
of the operation (principle of proportionality). Thirdly, the 
means of least harm to the civilian population or civilian 
objects must be chosen (principle of precaution).
As a basic prerequisite for an AWS to be deployed in com­
pliance with international law, it must therefore be able to 
reliably identify legitimate military targets. Whether this will 
be technically feasible at some point can hardly be reliably 
predicted from today’s perspective. Considering the current 
rapid technological development, it does not seem impos­
sible at least.
However, the real problem is different, since the mere 
identification of a person or object is far from sufficient to 
determine whether it is a legitimate military target. This 
requires a more comprehensive situation awareness as well 
as an assessment of the opponent’s behaviour and – ulti­
mately – intentions. For example, it is difficult to imagine 
how a wounded soldier could surrender to an AWS. This 
their cognitive capabilities and re­
sponsiveness. In a crisis, a spiral of 
escalation could thus be set in 
motion automatically and un­
intentionally.
 
The strategic balance be­
tween the nuclear weapons states is based on the 
assured second­strike capability and the resulting deterrence 
of a possible first strike. It is imaginable that very potent 
AWS might be used in the future as conventional first­strike 
weapons to destroy the enemy’s nuclear weapons arsenals. 
One conceivable scenario would be AWS, which could au­
tonomously detect targets such as missile silos or subma­
rines armed with nuclear weapons, remain undetected in 
their vicinity and then attack and destroy them on command 
in a coordinated manner. The mere fear that such a use of 
AWS would be actively pursued could seriously undermine 
strategic stability.
As explained above, the major powers ascribe a high military 
value to autonomous technologies in the long term. Tech­
nological breakthroughs by one side could fundamentally 
shake the existing balance of power. It is to be feared that 
The UN Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW)
The central forum for the debate on a possible containment 
of AWS at the international level is the UN Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). This UN agree­
ment was adopted in Geneva in 1980 and has been signed 
by 125 states so far. Since 2014, the issue of AWS has been 
on the agenda of the CCW. In 2016, a Group of Govern­
mental Experts (GGE) was established to clarify techno­
logical and definitional issues and, where appropriate, pave 
the way for formal negotiations on the prohibition or other 
regulation of AWS.
There is a broad consensus that there shall be no AWS 
that can or may make decisions on the use of violent 
means against people without any human interven­




ments in the positions of the individual states. Even a com­
monly agreed definition of AWS is still missing.
Some states and NGOs are calling for a prohibition or ban 
of AWS. Others currently prefer softer options, such as 
transparency and confidence­building measures. Still oth­
ers are opposed to any political activity, as there is not yet 
sufficient knowledge of AWS and their implications. As 
binding agreements require the unanimity of the CCW 
Parties, the chances of success of this process must be con­
sidered rather in a longer­term context – particularly since 
answers must be found to a complex series of issues, e. g. 
with regard to adequate verification, progressive prolifera­
tion or arms export control.
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and creating facts that make regulatory intervention difficult 
or even impossible. In the context of the implications that 
the international community will have to face in the future 
due to autonomous weapons systems, it seems to be urgently 
needed to address these challenges immediately and develop 
solutions. Within the framework of the UN Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and beyond, there 
are many ways of taking action to stimulate international 
dialogue, increase transparency and confidence and limit 
identified risks of AWS. Political and diplomatic initiatives in 
this regard require persevering efforts and a broad discourse 
involving science and civil society.
would require the correct interpretation of subtle signals 
including emotional signals as well as verbal and non­verbal 
communication. There are justifiable doubts as to whether 
AWS will be able to cope with such a situation in the fore­
seeable future.
Proponents of AWS point out that these weapons are not sub­
ject to typical human imperfections, such as fatigue, strong 
emotions (fear, anger, desire for revenge), etc., which – again 
and again – lead to violations of IHL and even to serious war 
crimes. Moreover, AWS would operate more precisely and 
faster than humans and would not have to fire for self­de­
fence before they have got a comprehensive situation aware­
ness. Thus, the deployment of AWS might bring significant 
humanitarian benefits.
In contrast, in the ethical debate on AWS, the argument is 
often put forward that killing people by means of autono­
mous systems is not compatible with human dignity. The 
victims would be undignified by being degraded to target 
objects in a purely technical process. In Germany and in 
many other liberal democratic societies, human dignity is 
considered to be a fundamental value that is particularly 
worthy of protection.
Outlook
The increasing use of automated and future autonomous 
weapons systems might represent a paradigm shift that will 
revolutionise warfare in the 21st century. The topic of AWS 
raises many questions: Is their deployment compatible with 
the principles of international humanitarian law? Does their 
proliferation trigger new armament dynamics? And what are 
the consequences for international security as well as re­
gional and strategic stability? The international community 
has begun to address these issues.
There is currently a window of opportunity to develop an 
internationally coordinated, targeted approach to limit the 
potential threats that AWS could imply. This window is grad­
ually closing as technological development advances and au­
tonomous functions are being continuously integrated into 
weapons systems of all kinds, thus consolidating structures 
